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1. Introduction 
      
   Broilers have been produced under contract since mid-century, and today, 85 percent of 
chickens are grown under contract. Judged by their prevalence, contracts are an integral part of 
organizing poultry production. Most  of the broiler contracts use  “two-part piece rate 
tournaments” payment structure consisting of a fixed base payment per pound of meat produced  
and a variable bonus payment based on the grower’s relative performance. Current literature on 
tournaments emphasizes their role in reducing moral hazard on the grower side and other 
contracting costs (Goodhue;Knoeber; Knoeber and Thurman, 1994; Knoeber and Thurman, 
1995; Vukina and Foster). It is claimed that the contracts have benefited farmers by offering 
opportunities to earn income with relatively low capital requirements. It has alleviated typical 
cash flow problems for the small farms, and induced enterprise diversification on the farm. It is 
argued that the significant gains from contracts comes through the reallocation of risk from the 
farmers to integrators who have means to act upon uncertain outcomes (Knoeber and 
Thurman1995) 
 
         Despite their favorable properties, many broiler growers are dissatisfied with the existing 
pay-structure.They have repeatedly expressed their concern about the relative performance 
payment structure based on tournaments. What they believe is that it is unfair to compare their 
production costs with those of other growers in determining their payments. They  consider this 
pay-structure unfair, may be, because they face group composition risks in it which arises from 
the homogenous treatment of the grower’s ability even though they are heterogeneous. They 
have complains that gains from contract arrangements are largely being appropriated by the 
integrators through that unfair relative payment structure, while they receive only small, or even 
negative, returns from contract production.  
 
Out of such concern for grower discontent, a number of states have made some failed 
attempts to protect growers. On the federal level, in 1997 the Grain Inspection, Packers and 
Stockyards Administration(GIPSA) of the US Department of Agriculture announced that it was 
considering “the need for issuing substantive regulations to address concerns in the poultry   3 
industry with respect contract payment provision tied to the performance of other 
growers.”(Federal Register,P.5935) which implies that policy makers are  taking such concerns  
seriously and moving forward to take necessary steps to protect contract growers. But the most 
relevant question is –what policy suggestions do they have to protect growers? Perhaps, none. In 
reality, public policy in this area needs sufficient guidance, which, in effect, requires extensive 
research to be conducted on integrator practices. But whatever the policy suggestions are , they 
might impose restrictions on the privately held transactions between the integrator and the 
contract growers. Imposed restrictions or regulations of any type on the privately held transaction 
may affect  different parties differently, may be at the cost of the efficiency. 
 
The closely related literature on franchising has generally been very critical of 
government regulation, on the grounds that any regulation will interfere with the ability of 
economic parties to negotiate efficient agreements (Beales and Muris; Brickley, Dark and 
Weisbach). Lewin, on the other hand, advocates in favor of regulation to allow the 
unionization of growers that would increase their bargaining power; she also favors the 
regulation of contract duration. 
 
         In a recent paper, Tsoulouhas and Vukina (2001) look at the welfare effects of a widely 
advocated regulatory measure restricting integrators from using tournaments replacing them with 
the payment structure based on the fixed standard. They have shown that , absent any other rules, 
the mandatory replacement of tournaments with fixed performance standards can decrease 
grower income insurance without raising welfare. But  income insurance and welfare can 
simultaneously be increased provided that the slope of the bonus payment scheme, the so called 
"piece rate," is also regulated. Moreover, the enforcement of fixed performance standards absent 
any rules for the magnitude of the piece rate will result in an unambiguous reduction in social 
surplus, but regulation accompanied by a rule determining the magnitude of the piece rate may or 
may not reduce social surplus, depending on the technology and preferences.  
 
From the grower’s perspective, even though the replacement of the  tournaments by fixed  
performance standard eliminates the group composition risk it  adds common production risk 
which is larger than group composition risk (Levy and Vukina). And ,also, as Tsoulouhas and   4 
Vukina  showed,  switching from a tournament to a fixed performance standard is not making 
growers better off without further regulation. But the question is –is there any way to regulate the 
existing contract  which is welfare improving for the growers and implementable ? If we can find 
any, then we don’t have to throw out the existing contract which is in place for the last half 
century. This is the question that I want to address in this paper. The regulator solves the 
integrator’s problem as a social surplus maximizer, and then  designs  the mechanism in such a 
way that  the integrator implements social surplus maximizing contract.  
 
          In case of the relative  payment structure based on the tournaments regulator may be able 
to increase the welfare of the growers regulating the average performance standard upward.If 
there is budgetary constraint then the regulator may be restricted severely in doing so.The paper 
is organized as follows. In the next section, I describe the model. The results are obtained and 
discussed in section 3. In the fourth section, I try to solve the problem with budget constraint. In 
the final section, I summarize the results.  
 
 
2. The Model 
 
       Based on the earlier work of Tsoulouhas and Vukina, we model the contractual relationship 
between a single integrator and a number of growers. They assume that each 
grower receives the same number of chicks that he is supposed to raise to the same target weight. 
Hence, the number of pounds produced is roughly the same for all growers and the performance 
differs depending only on the feed used. The amount of feed utilized by a grower stochastically 
depends on his own effort. By exerting effort, the grower can speed up the growth of animals 
that will reach market weight by consuming less feed. The integrator cannot directly observe the 
effort level of each grower, that is, there is "hidden action" moral hazard. The integrator can only 
observe the feed used and the output obtained by each grower. 
The sequence of moves is as follows. At the beginning, the  integrator offers a take-it-
or-leave-it contract to each grower specifying a payment schedule. Depending on this pay   5 
schedule, the growers decide whether to accept or reject the offers. If the growers accept the 
offers, then they exert effort and outcomes  (feed use) are realized. The integrator observes 
outcomes and makes the payment. If they reject the offers, each party receives his reservation 
payoff.  
 
As mentioned above, the output target for each grower is set to‘y . This is so because 
the integrator  treats all the growers homogeneously,  ex ante,   avoiding adverse selection 
problem.  Feed used by grower,  x
i, i  ˛  N ={ 1,2,...,n} is in the interval [xL,xH]. Let x  ” 
(x
1,...,x
n) and  x




n) denote the feed levels obtained by all growers 
including i and excluding i, respectively.  To derive the optimal utility payments, we characterize 
the incentive-efficient scheme assuming that  there are only two types effort  eL and eH. with where  









 denote the efforts exerted by all agents 
including i and excluding i, respectively. In the presence of common shocks, the distributions of 
feed are dependent. Let c(x/e) denote the joint density function of x given the actions of the 
growers, h(x
i/e) denote the marginal density obtained from c(x/e), and H(x
i /e) denote the 
distribution function. The density h(x/e) has full support, that is h(x
i /e)>0 for all e and all x, x
i. 
It is assumed that H(x
i / eL,
  e
-i)  £ H(x
i / eH,
  e




i  for every  x
i, with strict inequality 
for a set of values of  x
iwith positive probability, and for every e
-i  and i. These are first-order 
stochastic dominance conditions saying that the probability that the feed used by a grower 
exceeds any given level decreases with his effort.  




i is the grower's remuneration and c(e
i) is his disutility of effort. The function 
U(
.) is twice continuously differentiable, with U'(
.)>0, U"(
.)<0. The disutility of effort shows c¢(
.) 
>0 and c¢¢(
.) >0. The principal is risk-neutral with respect to profit. The output market is assumed 
to be competitive, the price of output p is deterministic and the price of feed is normalized to 
one. 
   6 
An optimal contract offered to grower i specifies a payment r
i depending on observed 
feed levels  x, r
i ( x). Let u
i(x)=U[r




denote equivalent income. Since U(
.) is increasing and strictly concave, U
-1  is increasing and 
strictly convex. To derive the optimal utility payments, we characterize the incentive-efficient scheme 
assuming that  the integrator benefits by implementing effort e H for the growers. Hence  , the 
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where w is welfare weight on the grower’s utility and  ) / ( e x E
i  is the expected feed utilization 
by grower i given effort e for all growers. Also where the constraints in (3) are individual 
rationality constraints, and those in (4) are Nash incentive compatibility constraints 
 
3. Results 
Since from conditional probability we know thatc(x/e)= h(x
i / 
 e)  g(x 
-i/ x
i ,e) it can be shown 
that the optimum incentive efficient scheme satisfies: 
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where l and m are multipliers for constraints (3) and (4). 
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Now, if we set w=0,then the problem will be the one for the integrator instead of the 
regulator. Then the condition (5) boils down to 
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Now, if we compare equation (5) and (5’) it is obvious that r
i(x) is larger in case of 
regulator’s scheme for any feed realization, since U(.) is concave and  ) ( w l + > l.  For the 
same effort eH, r
i(x) is larger for the regulator’s problem. Hence, if the regulator impose this pay 
structure on the integrator, the grower’s welfare will be larger because of larger payment for any 
feed realization.. But the reverse is true for the integrator. 
 
Integrator’s case 
Since the distributions of feed are not independent because of the presence of common 
uncertainty, individual feed utilization is not a sufficient statistic for xi with respect to individual 
effort; the density g(x 
-iI xi, e) depends on e
i. Hence, the feed levels obtained by the rest of the 
group convey information about common production uncertainty and, as a result, the effort 
choice of any given grower. In this case, condition (5¢) implies that the optimum compensation 
rule for grower i must depend not only on xi,but also on the feed levels obtained by all other 
growers, x 
-i. 
          To solve this problem, it requires the precise knowledge of distributional forms. 
However, as shown by Tsoulouhas and Vukina and Tsoulouhas, rule (5¢) can be simplified 
without distorting the incentives. For  sufficiently large the number of growers, the average feed 
used by all growers except i, ‘x 
-i 
 can convey information about the common production 
uncertainty, which suggests that the payment to each grower can depend only on the feed he   8 
utilized and‘x 
-i Given the output produced by all growers except i, the optimum compensation 
rule for grower i can be approximated by a Taylor series expansion at x = ‘ ‘x




i )                                               (6) 
where a grower is paid a base payment bo , to provide incentives to participate, adjusted by a 
positive or negative amount that depends on his relative performance (x
–i-x
i ) and the magnitude 
of the "piece rate" 0<bo <1. The  variable part provides incentives to exert effort. That’s the way 
how common uncertainty is removed from the grower's responsibility. 
 
Regulator’s case 
Now, the question is what rule do we get when we look at equation (5),i.e., when we look 
at the regulator’s problem? Only additional term that we have is the welfare weight w. If we 
rewrite (5), we have 
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Given the distribution and the preferences, for any realization of (
i i x x ,
-
), denominator of the 
right hand side of (5) is higher that that of (5¢). That means right hand side is smaller in 
regulator’s case. Hence, concavity of utility function gives us larger r
i(x) for the regulator’s case. 
Since this happen for any realization of (
i i x x ,
-
),  the optimum compensation rule for grower i 
can be approximated by a Taylor series expansion at x = (1+y (w))‘ ‘x
–i   which provides  
r
i(.)=bo+bo[(1+y(w))‘x
–i   -x
i ]                              (6¢) 
where   y¢(w) >0 . Now, for the feed realization of (
i x , x i - )  where 
i x = i - x ,the bonus 
payment is zero according to the existing rule adopted by the integrator. Whereas for the same 
realization of feed use, the regulator’s contract gives bonus of  bo y(w)x
i. This happens because 
the regulator cares about the welfare of the growers. As a result, she gives part of the surplus to 
the growers. But the question is how to implement the contract and where to set the value of the   9 
welfare weight, w? The implementation procedure is simple. Say, for y(w)=w and w=5%. Then 
(6¢) will give us 
r
i(.)=bo+bo[(105%‘x
–i   -x
i ] . 
Which shows that the standard is merely others’ average. Instead, it is 105% of others’ average. 
In case of existing pay structure, growers know their own average and others average. Only thing 
they need to do is to adjust others average by 105% provided the regulatory rule is in place. 
Setting  the value of  w is the political issue.      
 
4. Feasibility                
        So far it is assumed that there will be no budgetary constraint. That means the integrator 
can pay that additional amount from his profits. But if this is not the case and the regulator has 
some money (B) to spend on it, then the problem changes. If the budget constraint is
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Where g  is the multiplier for the budget constraint. In this case, g plays vital role in  
In the determination of the r
i(x). If  the budget is not binding we get the similar results as 
described above. But if the budget is binding then depending on the value of g ,the regulator’s 
Problem differs from the integrator’s problem. For some values of g ,both may have the similar 
results. In that case regulator may not be able to affect privately held transactions. 
 
   10 
5. CONCLUSION 
 
In case of the relative  payment structure based on the tournaments regulator may be able 
to increase the welfare of the growers regulating the average performance standard upward.If 
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